2. Previous Function
Head of the department for higher institutions of higher education of Ministry of Higher Education (20120906, 20131231)
Head of Sustainable Peace Research Institute Afghanistan Law and Political Studies Organization (20160126, 20170119, 20191019)
Spokesman of the Security and Stability Council of Afghanistan, Council of protection and stability Council of protection and stability (20180211, 20200209)

3. Biodata:
Masoud Tarashtwal Massoud Tarashtwal Masood Tarashtwal Masud Tarashtwal

Background:

The Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) is mostly made up of former cabinet members in the Karzai government and supporters of Dr Abdullah’s bid to be elected as president. Like Mujaddedi, Sayyaf at the inauguration of the CPSA said they had been driven to form the council by the current situation of the country. He demanded that a Constitutional Loya Jirga be convened, the electoral law reformed, parliamentary and district council elections held as scheduled, and reforms in the security and economic sectors made.

Sayyaf and Jamiat-e Islami stalwart, Yunus Qanuni, former vice-president and fellow member of the CPSA, stressed the need to implement the political agreement of the NUG in full, without spelling out how they would respond if this did not happen. Instead, Qanuni elaborated the council’s plans for the coming four years: active participation in the upcoming parliamentary and district council elections and the introduction of a candidate for the presidential elections of 2019.

Although the demands are more concrete, as with Mujaddedi’s CJNP, there seems to be little threat of a true opposition to the government here either. Many members of CPSA hold government positions, have close relations to the government or have factional comrades that do so. CPSA member Abdul Hadi Arghanidwal, for example, is leader of Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan; his deputy, Khan Muhammad, is first deputy to chief executive Dr Abdullah.
 

Other prominent members of CPSA include many former ministers: Muhammad Umer Daudzai and Bismillah Khan Muhammadi (both interior), Abdul Rahim Wardak (defence), Zalmai Rasul (foreign affairs), Wahid Shahrani (mines), Ismael Khan (energy and water) Sadiq Mudaber (former director of the office of administrative affairs) and Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi and Fazl Hadi Muslimyar, speakers of, respectively, the lower and upper houses of the parliament. Most of these men were part of the Karzai government and were backers of Abdullah in the 2014 elections; they can be expected to support at least the chief executive’s wing of the NUG.
 

The close affiliation with Abdullah of many of its members might, in part, explain why the council took such a mild position during the recent public rift between Abdullah and Ghani in 11 August 2016. Abdullah publicly criticised the president’s unilateralism in appointments as well as his disinclination to meet Abdullah one-on-one to discuss “fundamental issues.” President Ghani hit back, implicitly accusing the rival camp of blocking government reforms. While this provided opposition groups with an opportunity to weigh in and challenge the NUG as a whole. Sayyaf’s council spokesman Massud Tarashtwal only said, “We believe Afghanistan is greater and more important than both the president and the chief executive (…) [we want the government] not to keep the nation in frustration anymore.” The comment seemed to signal that the CPSA did not want to put the NUG under even more pressure by subjecting it to targeted criticism.