Head APPF:
Deputy Minister Jemal Sidiqi who also serves as chairman of the APPF SOE Executive Board

Two deputies:
Director of Operations: Brigadier General Sardar Mohammed Sultani (2012-20121009), MajGen Syed Kamal Sadat (20121010)
Director of Business Operations: Noorkhan Haidari,
Deputy: BG Ghulam Mujataba Patang (20120815)

A ‘state-owned security company’, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), is to gradually take over the security responsibilities for development projects and, together with the Ministry of Defence?, for ISAF convoy and site security. (20090325)

The APPF, as the state guard force is known, will be run by the Interior Ministry but will operate independently of the country’s conventional security forces. Taking control of the lucrative private security industry could represent a windfall for the cash-strapped government.(20111229)

A team of Afghans and Western officials set six goals for the APPF this year (2011). But the team’s latest assessment, issued in September 2011, concluded that the force was meeting none of the benchmarks, according to a Western government official who described the findings on the condition of anonymity because the report has not been publicly released.(20111229) Also a U.N. report to the Security Council noted that the assessment cast doubt about the readiness of the APPF, “particularly in terms of managing large-scale security projects in a fiscally and legally competent manner.”

Background:
The APPF plan calls for fielding some lightly armed, quickly trained gunmen associated with tribes. They will be used in important areas where the government is in danger of losing control. The APPF is not expected to be a stand-alone organization. It is one part of a larger, three-pillar, organization designed to support police functions.

The first pillar is the regular Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). The problem is that the AUP have too often been assigned basic tasks such as protecting roads, schools, and government buildings. They are reduced to being guards.

So the second pillar, the APPF, will release the AUP from these functions. The goal is not to create a "tribal militia" but something closer to a "neighborhood watch," albeit one more concerned about preventing beheadings and school burnings than burglaries.

The final pillar is the Anti-Crime Division to provide investigative services (i.e., police detectives). So, for example, the district of Panjwai, Kandahar Province, would have approximately 90 Afghan Uniform Police supported by six Anti-Crime Division investigators and 200 APPF.

The APPF program is meant to be a temporary organization while the training of regular Afghan National Police catches up with the need. APPF members who prove trustworthy and capable will have the opportunity to transfer to the Afghan National Army and Police. But once there is a sufficient number of trained Afghan National Police, the program will be disbanded.

There is significant disagreement on the potential effectiveness of a quickly trained and lightly armed force. There is also significant disagreement on how to implement the program. There is even the possibility that this kind of program could make security worse. These are all valid concerns. Every counterinsurgency operation is different. What works in other theaters, such as the Iraqi Awakening, may not work in Afghanistan.

The fundamental problem is that nobody really knows what the best implementation plan would be or how effective this kind of force would be. In Afghanistan, there have been similar programs that have failed, notably the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, or ANAP. The ANAP program was started in 2006 and shut down in 2008 because it turned out to be a divisive militia, often biased toward a particular tribe and manned by a large number of drug addicts and petty criminals.

The creation of the APPF should dramatically reduce the number of foreigners acting as security contractors in Afghanistan. It will also deprive some major Western security firms of their lucrative security contracts with donors and aid agencies. So the security firms, both Afghan and international, that blossomed over the past decade are the biggest obvious losers.

More Background (20120711)
Afghan Public Protection Force continues to make progress in taking over security for development work around the country. Over the last week, it has signed 10 contracts for security with companies executing development projects for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The APPF concluded six contracts with Development Alternatives International (DAI). These contracts will provide security for USAID projects including Regional Afghan Municipalities Program-East (RAMP-Up East), RAMP-UP West, RAMP-UP North, Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East (ASI-East), Agriculture Credit Enhancement (ACE), and Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives North, East and West (IDEA-NEW).

Chemonics, another USAID implementing partner, signed two contracts with the APPF covering five USAID projects: Afghan Stabilization Initiatives Program – South (ASI-South); Regional Afghan Municipalities Program – South (RAMP UP – South); Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA); Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAFA); and Famine Early Warning System-Network (FEWS-NET).

Finally, AECOM International Development signed two contracts with the APPF for the Stability in Key Areas – East (SIKA-East) and SIKA-West programs.